O ciclo comercial visto pela economia comportamental operante: Efeitos dos descontos nos preços sobre a receita recebida de serviços by Porto, Rafael Barreiros
AT
b
c
d
p
T
s
a
g
t
t
©
P
K
R
A
b
r
o
fi
d
p
s
–
0
bAvailable  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
Revista de Administração
http://rausp.usp.br/Revista de Administração 51 (2016) 310–322
Marketing
The commercial cycle from the viewpoint of operant behavioral economics:
effects of price discounts on revenues received from services
O ciclo comercial visto pela economia comportamental operante: Efeitos dos descontos nos prec¸os
sobre a receita recebida de servic¸os
El ciclo comercial desde la perspectiva de la economía conductual operante: efectos de los
descuentos de precio en los ingresos de servicios
Rafael Barreiros Porto ∗
Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, Brazil
Received 23 January 2014; accepted 11 February 2016
bstract
he relationship between supply and demand generates commercial cycles. Operant behavioral economics explain that these cycles are shaped
y three-term bilateral contingencies – situations that create supply and demand responses and which, in turn, generate reinforcing or punitive
onsequences that can maintain or mitigate these. Research shows how the commercial cycle of a company occurs and investigates how price
iscounts affect basic and differentiated service revenues according to seasonality. Based on a longitudinal design, two time-series analyses were
erformed using the ARIMA model, while another was carried out using a Generalized Estimating Equations divided into seasonal combinations.
he results show, among other things, (1) that a company handles most of the marketing context strategies and programmed consequences of
ervices used by consumers, creating a new commercial situation for the company, (2) the effects of price discounts on sophisticated services have
 positive impact and produce higher revenues during the low season, while those related to basic services have a greater impact and produce
reater revenue during the high season; and (3) the seasonality of the greatest purchasing intensity exerts a more positive influence on revenues
han the seasonality of demand characterized by heterogeneous reinforcements. These findings are useful for the administration of price discounts
o generate maximum revenue and make it possible to have a better understanding of the way the commercial cycle of a company functions.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
s relac¸ões entre oferta e demanda geram ciclos comerciais. A economia comportamental operante explicita que eles são formados por contingências
ilaterais de três termos – contextos criadores de condic¸ões às respostas do ofertante e demandante que, por sua vez, geram consequências
eforc¸adoras ou punitivas capazes de mantê-las ou atenuá-las. A pesquisa demonstra como ocorre o ciclo comercial de uma empresa, averigua
 efeito dos descontos de prec¸o na receita de servic¸os básicos e diferenciados com diferentes sazonalidades. Com delineamento longitudinal,
zeram-se duas análises em séries temporais com modelo ARIMA e outra com Equac¸ões de Estimativas Generalizadas divididas em combinac¸ões
e sazonalidades. Os resultados demonstram, dentre outros, que a empresa manipula boa parte dos contextos de marketing e das consequências
rogramadas de uso de servic¸o pelos consumidores da empresa, cria um novo contexto comercial para ela; os efeitos dos descontos em servic¸os
ofisticados são positivamente maiores na receita durante em baixa temporada, enquanto dos servic¸os básicos são positivamente maiores em∗ Correspondence to: Universidade de Brasília, Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro, 70910-900 Brasília, DF, Brazil.
E-mail: rafaelporto@unb.br
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alta temporada; e a sazonalidade de maior intensidade de compra exerce maior influência positiva sobre a receita do que a sazonalidade de
heterogeneidade de reforc¸os daqueles que compram. Os resultados auxiliam a gestão de desconto na gerac¸ão da máxima receita e permitem
compreender o comportamento do ciclo comercial de uma empresa.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Ciclo comercial; Economia comportamental; Receita; Desconto em prec¸o; Sazonalidade; Marketing de servic¸o
Resumen
Las relaciones entre oferta y demanda generan ciclos comerciales. La economía conductual operante explica que éstos se forman por contingencias
bilaterales de tres términos - contextos que crean condiciones para las respuestas de oferta y de demanda que, por su parte, dan origen a consecuencias
que refuerzan o punen, y que son capaces de mantenerlas o mitigarlas. El estudio demuestra cómo se produce el ciclo comercial de una empresa
y averigua el efecto de los descuentos de precios en los ingresos de servicios básicos y diferenciados en distintas estacionalidades. Por medio de
disen˜o longitudinal, se llevaron a cabo dos análisis en series de tiempo con modelo ARIMA y otro con ecuaciones de estimación generalizadas
divididos en combinaciones de estacionalidad. Los resultados muestran que el ofertante maneja los contextos de marketing y las consecuencias
programadas de la utilización de servicios por los demandantes, creando un nuevo entorno comercial para él; los efectos de los descuentos en
servicios sofisticados son positivamente más altos en los ingresos durante la temporada baja, mientras que descuentos de servicios básicos son más
altos y positivos en temporada alta; y la estacionalidad de mayor volumen de compras ejerce una influencia más positiva en los ingresos que la
estacionalidad de heterogeneidad de refuerzos de los que compran. Los resultados contribuyen a la gestión de descuentos para generar mayores
ingresos y permiten comprender el comportamiento del ciclo comercial de una empresa.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The differentiations of services are at the core of any debate
bout the exclusivity, luxury and sophistication that a com-
any can offer consumers (Brun & Castelli, 2013; Veríssimo
 Loureiro, 2013). However, in general, these services charge
igher prices since they offer consumers greater benefits (Kohli
 Suri, 2011). On the other hand, the supply of basic ser-
ices that succeed in attracting a demand are less expensive and
ake it possible to match supply in relation to other competitor
ervice suppliers (Abrate, Fraquelli, & Viglia, 2012). Between
ne extreme and another of a company’s service portfolio, if
he price discounts are well applied (Yao, Mela, Chiang, &
hen, 2012), these can increase more than proportionally the
umber of consumers as compared to the non-implementation
f such actions. A company that offers a range of market
roducts (Elmaraghy & Elmaraghy, 2014) that include differen-
iated and basic services, combined with an adequate discount
olicy, can increase their revenue and, in turn, their financial
rofits.
However, each service provided by the same company can
nvolve different consumers. These may face restrictions as
egards paying the contract price offered and depend on a price
iscount to be able to make purchases (Kohli & Suri, 2011). This,
n turn, has a different impact according to the season surround-
ng the company offerings. Thus, the demand for a service tends
o oscillate (Hanssens, Parsons, & Schultz, 2003), with low and
igh moments and with or without a heterogeneous structure.
n order to meet demand, supply is therefore controlled by the
vailability of the number of services, their differentials, periods
hen these are offered and prices given to them. Thus, revenue
t
panagement (Talluri & Ryzin, 2005) ends up controlling the
ash flows from the services and these can appeal to a larger
egment of consumers, thereby ensuring profits.
In the hospitality industry, managers of hotels, resorts,
ats and guesthouses experience this routine on a daily basis
Menezes & Silva, 2013). During the low season, reduced
rices are usually offered to generate sufficient accommodation
ccupancy rates and thereby boost income, though this is not
ecessarily the case for all habitation units, especially as het-
rogeneity exists between different consumers. Price variations
ttract a certain group of consumers more than another and these
ay or may not be effective in generating the maximum possible
evenue.
In addition to Service-Dominant Logic (SDL) in marketing
Lusch & Vargo, 2014), where interaction between the consumer
nd the company is essential in order to attain better company
erformances, the consumers and the companies co-create and
o-produce the services offered. By means of knowledge and
bility, manager can operationalize the supply of services, in the
ope of generating greater revenues and profits for the company,
hich they will only do if consumers pay for their services. This
esearch uses a theoretical framework that is both coherent and
omplementary to SDL. It is coherent because it meets all the
asic SDL requirements and it complements SDL because it
dds behavioral aspects to the consumer–company relationship,
ringing together empirical findings on an individual analy-
is level with elements on an organizational and contextual
evel.One of the difficulties in managing maximum revenue is how
o recognize, during different periods of time, when a discount
olicy for each service will generate greater or less income
3 inistração 51 (2016) 310–322
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or enterprises and how long these effects will last. This is at
he heart of the working ability of a marketing professional
Theodosiou, Kehagias, & Katsikea, 2012), which may or may
ot be efficient and effective (Keh, Chu, & Xu, 2006). This
esearch shows what can be done in such a situation. The spe-
ific objective of this research was to evaluate the effect that price
iscounts have on revenue derived from differentiated and basic
ervices during different seasons. In general terms, the aim of
his study was to show how the commercial cycle of a company
perates from an operant economic-behavioral viewpoint, with
he investigation of what marketing professionals actually do to
timulate sales of services. Thus, this work serves as an aid to
ervice managers who aim to increase their income and adjust
heir prices to meet the demand for each one of their services.
perant  behavioral  economics:  explaining  the
elationship between  the  supply  and  demand  of
roducts/service pricing
An area known as behavioral economics has researched
 wide variety of firm-related issues, both from a cogni-
ive (Angner & Loewenstein, 2010) and an operant viewpoint
Madden, 2000). Both adopt the premise of actors having
ounded rationality (Simon, 1972). However, the latter concen-
rates more on the relationship experiences between the behavior
nd consequences to consumers, entrepreneur, investors and
anagers when they are individual economic units – which can
ncluded aggregated data (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009) – than
n their thought processes, with greater emphasis on the former.
he operant perspective supports the relevance of a neoclassical
nalysis to understand economic behavior, but not in an acritical
ay. On the contrary, this shows that, even without taking into
ccount rational assumptions, the micro-economic phenomena
an be explained by means of the evolutionary relationships
etween behavior and its environment in a single behavioral
heoretical framework (Foxall, 2015).
In actual terms, the theories involved in this area are con-
erned with describing and explaining how environments create
he necessary conditions for these economic unit behavior pat-
erns to occur and the consequences of these relationships
Franceschini & Ferreira, 2013). In addition, these investi-
ate consumer patterns, expenses, savings, investments, brand
hoices, the contexts that can affect these (e.g. price discounts,
ncome) as well as the consequences of the relationships of time
nd space between behavioral patterns and their contexts; which
ay or may not be mediated by the social environment (Foxall,
010; Foxall, Oliveira-Castro, James, & Schrezenmaier, 2007;
ranceschini & Ferreira, 2013; Madden, 2000).
In spite of the fact that this economic area has mathe-
atically and empirically shown the relationships that exist
etween the above-mentioned concepts (Pindyck & Rubinfeld,
009), there is no integrated model that can explain why and
ow these are related. On the other hand, by using an oper-
nt approach, combined with traditional Darwinian principles,
 behavioral analysis represents a solid basis (Oliveira-Castro &
oxall, 2005). It uses concepts and findings produced through
xperimental research, usually conducted in laboratories, testing
t
e
o
iFig. 1. Bilateral contingencies (Foxall, 1999), adapted by the author.
oth human as well as infrahuman subjects [e.g.: monkeys, rats
Baum, 2005)], that translate and specify economic concepts
nto behavioral operations. This has made it possible to explain
nd integrate innumerable economic phenomena in a more sub-
tantial and parsimonious manner.
The conceptual model most often used is described by
kinner (1974) as being a 3-term contingency, that specifies
he conditions (Term 1) for which a response (Term 2) produces
ne or several consequence(s) (Term 3). This model was duly
omplemented and contextualized to illustrate the relationship
etween individual economic units (e.g. consumer, family, com-
any) by Foxall (1999) – as can be seen in Fig. 1. This involves
 3-term bilateral relationship, in that the top contingency refers
o the supplier (sup) or marketing professional and the lower one
efers to the demand (dem) or consumer.
Foxall (1999) states that relationships of economic exchange
re necessary and sufficient in themselves to ensure that mar-
eting activities exist within a company. Thus, in the lower
ection of Fig. 1, consumer behavior (e.g. purchase response) is
receded by a context formed by discriminant stimuli – SDdem
e.g. availability of product or service for a price) and includes
onsequences (e.g. utility of the product or service acquired –
tilitarian), which can be reinforcers (SRdem) or punishments
SPdem). The former increases the possibility of the same con-
umer purchase response on future occasions when for example
he product ends or the services terminate, while the latter
educes these chances. Vella and Foxall (2011) also suggest that
he consumer reinforcers can be utilitarian and informational, in
hat the former is mediated by the use of the product or service
tself, such as comfort and convenience (Foxall, 2010) while the
atter consists of social reinforcers, such as luxury (Yeoman &
cmahon-Beattie, 2006), sophistication (Liu, 2010), exclusiv-
ty (Brun & Castelli, 2013), among others.
However, the consumer purchase responses themselves func-
ion as discriminant stimuli – SDof (contexts, also known as the
elationship between environmental events) – for the offeror (e.g.
oney received), since, as these are relationships of exchange,
he consumer pays (e.g. hands over money or uses credit, etc.),
hich is characterized as a monetary exchange. The discriminant
unction for the offeror (e.g. money received) occurs because of
his exchange (Vella & Foxall, 2011), but at the same time, this
ncourages him to operate his firm directed toward maintaining
r creating new stimuli for the consumer (e.g. creating new sett-
ngs where consumers can buy products, maintain or create new
inist
p
–
c
t
r
s
e
b
t
t
p
a
m
s
c
a
w
e
t
e
i
c
i
t
o
a
u
(
t
s
p
b
c
a
i
t
c
(
t
f
u
t
d
p
r
a
d
n
f
d
&
r
s
s
o
s
t
t
p
o
t
(
(
p
I
i
a
i
b
r
t
r
a
t
h
a
o
r
t
r
c
i
a
t
f
s
f
(
r
(
a
t
r
s
d
s
b
t
d
c
h
DR.B. Porto / Revista de Adm
roducts or services, etc.). When the offeror do this, reinforcers
 SRof (profit) or punishment – SPof (for example, financial loss)
onsequences are generated for him.
The consumer’s payment response, in the aggregate, func-
ions as a discriminant stimulus for the offeror, generating
evenue for the company (SDof). This discriminant stimulus
erves as the situation for the supplier’s subsequent behavior,
nabling him to be remunerated and/or extract profit from his
usiness. The situation or context has multiple dimensions, a
emporal dimension being one of these. There are periods of
he year when a greater number of consumers buy products and
eriods when fewer consumers buy them. If higher payments
re made during each cycle, the company would grow in com-
ercial terms, and monetary exchange would therefore be the
ource of a company’s financial growth.
In turn, there are also periods when a company will attract
onsumers who seek different reinforcers (e.g. exclusivity), cre-
ting a situation where the offeror works to provide consumers
ith new and distinct offers (Evans, 2003; Smith, 1956). If prop-
rly done, this will produce income and a positive reinforcer in
he form of profits (or punishment as loss) for the supplier at the
nd of his behavioral chain. This profit (or loss) can feed back
nto the system.
The supplier response can generate profits for the offeror and
an create a situation for future consumer purchases depend-
ng on how well he carries out his marketing activities. That is
o say, this depends on how successfully he offers his products
r services, which can generate reinforces that are increasingly
dapted to suit each demand, as well as pricing each prod-
ct and making it possible to increase sales. Vella and Foxall
2013) characterize these as reinforcement and punishment con-
rol (SRdem and SPdem, respectively) and consumer situation (or
cenario) control (SDdem). Thus, the effectiveness of a marketing
rofessional’s performance, or that of a supplier as a whole, can
e measured by the way he generates reinforcers and reduces
ompany punishments and, at the same time, generates more
ttractive situations, allocates reinforcers and reduces the pun-
shment process for the consumer.
This makes the work of the offeror (commercial adminis-
rator or marketing professional) extremely technical, with the
apability of being effective or otherwise. Each task performed
operant supplier responses) with these aims has functional fea-
ures (Catania, 1973), but which vary as regards topography:
requency of emission (how often is the same functional task
ndertaken), force or magnitude (degree of effort, or how much
echnique or technology is needed to perform a functional task),
uration (the time it takes to perform an operational task) and
eriod of latency (the time it takes to issue the first functional
esponse). Depending on how effectively these characteristics
re employed, the result of the work serves as a source for the
emand context (SDdem) and, if this leads to an increase in the
umber of consumers and their shopping rates (demand response
requency or magnitude), revenues will increase (SDof).The variety of products/services that a company offers is
irectly associated with their consumer acceptance (Elmaraghy
 Elmaraghy, 2014). This acceptance is reflected in shopping
ates. Companies offering the greatest variety of products/
n
o
eração 51 (2016) 310–322 313
ervices meet the demand for a wide variety of features at the
ame time and thereby tend to increase their revenue (SDof). This
ccurs because of the availability (Responseof) of differentiated
ophisticated products/services offered by a business (magni-
ude of a response that generates a high level of reinforcement
o meet demand) aimed at creating temporary monopolies by
roviding customers with exclusive or singular products (a type
f SRdem) (Brun & Castelli, 2013). This can avoid the need
o reduce prices (responseof), and, in turn, a fall in revenue
reduction of SDof) if the same number of clients is maintained
aggregated responseDem), when local competitors reduce their
rices (Responseof alternative) (Becerra, Santaló, & Silva, 2013).
n turn, by offering basic services (Responseof), offering min-
mum quality (magnitude of response that generates low or
verage reinforcement for demand), ensures a constant demand
f priced at a lower value (low or average SPdem).
In this way, both the differentiated services offered and the
asic services offered are market strategies that can increase
evenues, by means of monetary exchanges with consumers,
hough these attract different aspects as regards this increase in
evenue. The first charges a much higher price (or does not make
 significant price reduction when there are competitors), while
he second aims to become more competitive in attracting a
igher demand for a lower price. By using both tactics together,
 company will manage to increase the intensity and variety
f demand. These strategies can produce different effects on
evenue and, sometimes, one can represent a better option than
he other so as to increase it. These are the focus points of this
esearch study.
In addition, the same company with its portfolio of service
an offer more than one type of differential, while maintain-
ng one basic service. This means that the type of influence
 company makes is far from clear. Thus, this research aims
o examine a basic non-differentiated service (low reinforcers
or demand) and two types of service differentials (consumer
ervices that offer high differential and concurrent reinforcers
or the demand). This can characterize discriminative stimulus
Catania, 1998) for consumers: when present, this indicates a
einforcer that is different from when another stimulus is present
which indicates another reinforcer).
For each day that a product or service is offered, there is
n associated programmed punishment for the consumer (e.g.
o pay the price). The marketing professional can increase or
educe this and his task is effective if his pricing makes it pos-
ible to increase subsequent revenue. Traditionally, the price
iscounts (Yao et al., 2012) make it possible to reduce the con-
equences of a demand punishment (SPdem), making a purchase
ehavior more likely to occur. Thus, the exact level of discount
hat makes it possible to increase more than proportionally the
emand without reducing revenue, is essential so that a commer-
ial cycle can occur. This level of discount can be designed to
ave an immediate response or a delayed response (Hanssens &
ekimpe, 2012). The present research examined the effective-
ess and duration of these discounts on different types of market
ffers, with the aim of generating more income.
However, the payments made to a company by a wide vari-
ty of consumers can occur with greater intensity at different
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involved, as can be seen in Table 1. This shows that the different
discounts implemented by the hotel chain are based on three
factors.14 R.B. Porto / Revista de Adm
eriods. This is characterized as temporal commercial contexts
hat consumers generate in benefit of the supplier (intensity of
esponse dem of aggregated purchases over time and the period
f greatest number of varied reinforcers (SRdem varied) associated
ith responsesdem).
Depending on these contexts, conditions are created that
ake it either easier or more difficult to obtain an increase in rev-
nue (SDof). These are dimensions of the market segmentations
 heterogeneity and consumer intensity (Evans, 2003; Smith,
956). Thus, characteristics of seasonality, low and high season
Nadal, Font, & Rosselló, 2004) and commercial working days
nd weekends (Jeffrey & Barden, 2000) are temporal situations
hat can interfere in the effect that discounts (punishment reduc-
ion) have on each service (Hanssens et al., 2003). This is an
ssue covered and is also present in this research study.
In the language of operant behavioral economics, the purpose
f this research is to test the effect of the supplier’s response
n generating future commercial contexts over time, in a way
hat is favorable to the offeror (greater revenue), reducing the
nancial punishment associated with the degree of reinforcers
rogrammed by the supplier for consumers (basic and differen-
ial service discounts) within distinct temporal demand contexts.
hat is to say, this research aims to test the commercial cycle of
he Model shown in Fig. 1 during periods when there is a varia-
ion in the intensity of demand responses and the heterogeneity
f reinforces allocated to these responses.
This proposal offers a complement to the Service Dominant
ogic (Lusch & Vargo, 2014), by providing a general con-
extualization for matters previously described, and the use of
ehavioral terms to explain this phenomena. The area of mar-
eting is often criticized for not using theoretical arguments to
xplain its phenomenon (Hunt, 2010), even though there is a
ood deal of empirical evidence to show how marketing phe-
omenon can be useful to organizations and consumers alike.
Key evidence, including the effect that sales discounts have
n sales and service demands, has been well documented (Line
 Runyan, 2012; Yoo, Lee, & Bai, 2011). It is known that
ompanies that describe themselves as service leaders imple-
ent more pricing strategies and that these produce greater
ustomer perception as regards revenue, profit and brand aware-
ess (Indounas, 2015). In addition, the higher the level of price
iscounts, the greater perception a customer has as regards sav-
ngs, purchase intention and quality (Hu, Parsa, & Khan, 2006,
hap. 2).
However, these studies offer no explanation as to why these
ccur and, in particular, their effectiveness in generating revenue
or a company as a result of the interaction between services and
ricing. Enz, Canina, and Lomanno (2009) are among the only
esearchers who tested the effects that pricing has on the revenue
f a hospitality service company, using actual data, over a period
f time. They found that there is price-revenue inelasticity in this
ype of service and that the best strategy to increase revenue is
o maintain high prices, even though these do not lead to a high
emand (high occupancy rate). These authors also found that
rice discounts encourage increased occupancy rates, but do not
ncrease revenue and macro-economic data have little effect on
evenue. Nração 51 (2016) 310–322
In spite of this study, various aspects related to service pri-
ing remain open, including issues related to the moderating
ffects of the price-revenue relationship, longitudinal studies
ith actual prices on a daily basis, the allocation of differential
rice strategies so that the same company can offer consumers
ifferent benefits, control the role that seasonality plays over
horter periods of time (monthly and daily) and employ objec-
ive metric to evaluate performance, which are rarely used in this
rea, etc. By showing how the commercial cycle occurs using
n operant approach, marketing capabilities, which originate in
he technical abilities of the professionals involved in this activ-
ty, can be explained and these limitations overcome. Marketing
rofessionals do not carry out their work in a vacuum or with-
ut a purpose in observance. However, there is still very little
heoretical knowledge available to explain the nature of their
bjectives. The present study therefore aims to remedy this lack
f information.
ethod
This ex  post  facto  research study was conducted1 using a lon-
itudinal design. Every day, the researcher registered data from
 medium-size company belonging to the hotel sector located
n the Central West region of Brazil. This firm represents over
50 collaborators, including the general manager and a man-
ger for each one of its departments. Secondary company data
as obtained by means of a regional operational and commer-
ial system of sales information, prices, and accommodation
ccupancy rates, among others. Once the general manage-
ent had given their authorization, the data was organized and
rranged so that a daily temporal series of analyses could be
onducted.
With regards to the town researched, business tourism and
vents occur with greater frequency than leisure activities
Lemes, 2009). The hotel chosen for the purpose of this research
eflected this type of demand characteristic during commercial
orking days for this consumer segment. However, in addition
o these, there was also leisure tourism at the weekends.
Data used included information about the hotel since its inau-
uration in that town, as well as a sampling of the hotel services
uring 120 consecutive calendar days. The power of the mul-
iple regression sampling test (average effect f2 = 0.15) with 3
redictors (price discount factors) came to around 95.2%. That
s to say, even with a reduced sample size, this was enough to
ismiss the incidence of a Type II Error in this research study.
The discounts were calculated in percentages based on the
rice paid for each room divided by the prices shown on the
ist of daily rates. This was subtracted by one and multiplied by
ne hundred. Since the price of the rooms varied, a Principal
omponents Analysis was conducted so as to show the factors1 This research study has received financial support from the Brazilian
ational Council for Scientific & Technological Development – CNPq.
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Table 1
Factor loadings for price discount factors.
Discount on non-differentiated
services (standardized in relation
to other hotels)
Discount on sophisticated
differentiated services
(presidential suites)
Discount on differentiated
services that are
environmentally friendly
Crombach’s alpha 0.76 0.63 0.84
Discount on a superior suite 0.91
Discount on a standard double room 0.90
Discount on a deluxe room 0.80
Discount on a standard single room 0.57
Discount on a presidential suite-cer 0.78
Discount on a presidential suite-pan 0.68
Discount on a presidential suite-mat 0.66
Discount on a presidential suite-exe 0.55
Discount on a presidential suite-ama 0.36
Discount on a double green suite 0.88
Discount on a deluxe green suite 0.82
Discount on a deluxe green suite 0.72
Discount on an anti-allergic green suite 0.71
Discount on a single green suite 0.68
KMO = 0.73
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ource: Prepared by the author of this article.
These discounts take into account the levels of accom-
odation differentials. The “Discount on non-differentiated
ervices”, with α  = 0.76, average = 22.6% and standard devia-
ion = 8.2%, consists of rooms that are similar to those of other
otels of the same level (standard single and double rooms,
eluxe and master suites) with standard services and reception.
he factor “Discount on sophisticated differential services”,
ith α  = 0.63, average = 19.5% and standard deviation = 22.7%,
onsists of customized presidential accommodation with recep-
ion and exclusive happy hour services available, as well
s tea-service, bath robes and slippers, and may include
 Jacuzzi.
The third and final factor “Discounts for differentiated
ervices that are environmentally friendly, with α = 0.84,
verage = 8.8% and standard deviation = 10.5%, consists of dis-
ounts for hotel rooms that value well-being and harmony as
art of the accommodation they offer their guests, with 100% of
heir floors established as no-smoking areas, with fragrant atmo-
pheres and including special amenities, such as anti-allergic
ooms and the use of ecological materials.
Thus, these three factors constitute the discount factors cov-
red by this study, each one measured on the basis of an
verage percentage. The average price of the service rates for
on-differential rooms was equivalent to US$ 207.75 (standard
eviation = US$ 62.65). The rate for a room with sophisticated
ifferential features was equivalent to US$ 1450.00 (standard
eviation = US$ 497.05), and in the case of a room with dif-
erentiated and environmentally friendly services, the price was
quivalent to US$ 186.50 (standard deviation = US$ 53.26).
The total daily income (revenue) was calculated on the basis
f the sum total of the number of times each service or item was
old multiplied by the price paid by each one per day. This was
ubdivided in partial daily revenue, namely: revenue derived
rom non-differentiated services, revenue from sophisticated
t
(
rifferentiated services and revenue from differentiated envi-
onmentally friendly services using the same formula used for
he total revenue, though restricted to these services alone. The
otel chain’s revenue averaged US$ 25,616.90 per day, with a
tandard deviation equal to US$ 16,373.40.
In this research study, the sum total of daily revenue was
veraged out by the average monthly revenue. In this way, val-
es equal to one are included in the average monthly revenue,
bove (below) one are higher (lower) than the monthly average
onthly. The relative daily revenue, a dependent variable in this
tudy, showed an average equal to one and a standard devia-
ion equal to 9.6. The overall occupancy rate was measured by
he number of rooms occupied divided by the total number of
ooms available on a daily basis, which was also sub-divided
nto different types of accommodation.
A descriptive data analysis is shown in Table 2. As can be
een, this shows that there was a reasonable overall occupancy
ate. In addition, the rooms with the highest occupancy rates
ere those without differential features, in spite of the high
tandard deviations. The greater variance revenues were those
ffering sophisticated differentiated services, while those offer-
ng smaller discounts were those that provided differentiated and
nvironmentally friendly services.
In all, this article presents three statistical analyses. The first
ims to show the effect of each discounts on accommodation
ervice provided (reducing monetary punishments associated
ith different degrees and types of reinforcers that the sup-
lier programs for the consumer) in the composition of revenues
composition of SDof).
The second aims to show the effects that types of season-
lity (intensity of responsesdem for aggregated purchases over
ime and the period of the greatest number of varied reinforcers
SRdem varied) associated with responsesdem) have on the total
evenue (SDof).
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Table 2
Descriptive data analysis.
Descriptive data Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
General occupancy rate (%) 51.7 29.0 8.1 99.6
Occupancy rate of non-differential rooms (%) 50.9 28.3 0.8 100
Occupancy rate for rooms with sophisticated differential (%) 35.2 0.3 0.0 100
Occupancy rate of environmentally friendly accommodation (%) 34.9 0.3 0.0 100
Total revenue (relative) 1.0 0.6 0.1 2.6
Revenue for differential services (relative) 1.0 0.6 0.1 2.4
Revenue for sophisticated differential services (relative) 1.0 1.9 0.0 11.4
Revenue for environmentally friendly diff. services (relative) 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.2
Discounts for non-differential services (%) 22.5 8 0 43
Discounts for sophistical diff. services (%) 19.5 22.7 0 95
Discounts for environmentally friendly diff. services (%) 8.8 10.5 0 70
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The third analysis, derived from the two previous analy-
es, was to establish the everyday effects that discounts of
ach service (reducing monetary punishments associated with
ifferent levels and types of reinforcers programmed by the
upplier for the consumer) had on total revenue (SDof), in accor-
ance with seasonal demand dimensions (intensity of purchase
esponsesdem aggregated over time and the period of the great-
st number of varied reinforcers (SRdem varied) associated with
esponses dem). The analytical unit of each analysis is based on
aily revenue.
In the first analysis, an autoregressive integrated moving
verage – ARIMA model was used for each composition of
evenue. This was necessary as the revenue data (partial and
otal) were shown to be auto-correlated (Durbin–Watson  var-
ed between 0.8 and 1.3, the reference value being = 2) and
on-stationarity (the Augmented Dickey–Fuller  tests were non-
ignificant for p  > 0.05 for two partial revenues). However, it was
ecessary to integrate the ARIMA model by the first difference.
he normality assumptions of the independent variables (the
olmogorov–Smirnov  tests were non-significant for p  > 0.05)
nd homoscedasticity were met (White LM Test were all sig-
ificant for p  ≤  0.05). The models that better adapted to the data
re described in Table 3 of these findings. For revenue derived
rom non-differential services (Sof from the low magnitude
esponseof), the best model was the one with = 1; difference = 0
umber of auto-regressive terms.
For revenue earned from non-differentiated services (Sof
erived from low magnitude responsesof), the best model was the
ne with auto regressive term of = 1; difference = 0; and a moving
verage term number of = 0. In the case of revenue derived from
ifferential sophisticated services (Sof derived from a high mag-
itude responseof), the best model was the one with a number of
uto regressive term of = 1; difference = 1; and a moving average
erm of = 0. For revenue derived from differentiated environ-
entally friendly services (Sof derived from an alternative high
agnitude responseof), the best model was the one with a num-
er of auto regressive terms of = 0; difference = 1; and a moving
verage term of = 0.
In the second analysis (Table 4), in order to demonstrate
he aggregated effect of consumer purchase responses in terms
w
s
df revenue, the ARIMA Model was also used (number of
uto regressive terms = 2; difference = 0; a moving average term
f = 7), the explicative variables being the seasonal dimen-
ions (high season versus low season and commercial working
ays versus weekend days) were dichotomized and treated as
vent variables. An average of the total relativized revenue was
sed as a dependent variable. It was seen that the monthly
easonality (Nadal et al., 2004) measures the period of higher
ntensity of purchase responsedem and the weekly seasonality
easures the period of the greatest number of varieties/types
f reinforcers available to consumers, since during commercial
orking days hotel guests generally consist of business or event
ourists and, during weekends, of guests who had considered
he previous two options, as well as leisure tourists (Lemes,
009).
In the third analysis (Fig. 3), in order to demonstrate
he overall effects of the commercial cycle on revenue, the
ariable seasons were used as environmental variables that
nteract with discount strategies. For this, a sample sep-
ration for each season dimension combination was used
nd the effects of the three service discount factors were
ested for the total revenue, by means of a Generalized
stimating Equation. Thus, in each seasonality combination,
here is an equation with independent discount variables
Ytssea = log B(Disc1tssea) + log B(Disc2tsea) + log B(Disc3tsea)].
 log-linear model was used, with a matrix work structure
R(1), considered to be the best for these data (lower QIC).
The four combinations of the two dimensions of seasonality
nvolved in this third analysis were as follows: (1) low season
emand during weekends (LSWE), when there is a low number
f consumers with high heterogeneity of reinforces available
o meet demand; (2) low season during commercial working
ays (LSWD), which presents a low number of consumers
ith low heterogeneity of reinforcers available to meet demand;
3) high season during weekends (HSWE) that present a high
umbers of consumers with low heterogeneity of reinforcers
vailable to meet demand; and (4) high season and commercial
orking days (HSWD) that present a high number of con-
umers with low heterogeneity of reinforcers available to meet
emand.
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esults
he  effect  of  discounts  for  each  service  on  the  composition
f revenue
Table 3 shows findings related to the impact caused by reduc-
ng monetary punishments associated with different levels and
ype of reinforcers, which are programmed by the offeror to con-
umers, in relation to the composition of the commercial context
revenues) received by the offeror.
The partial revenues earned lagged in one day, from differ-
ntiated services and from sophisticated differentiated services,
ad a positive effect on the current revenue, which indicates
n upward trend in their predicted value. Thus, the previous
Dof increase (previous commercial context) tends to gener-
te an increase in the subsequent SDof (subsequent commercial
ontext). However, the partial revenues derived from environ-
entally friendly services do not present the same effect. That
s to say, the previous context in this case did not generate the
ubsequent context.
All the explanatory variables (discounts for each service,
hich are also known as offeror’s responses) had a positive
nfluence on their respective revenues, with greater impact for
ervices that offered advanced differentials, environmentally
t
r
i
able 3
ffects of each discount on the (partial) revenue.
Variables 
V: Revenue from non-differential
ccommodation
Constant 
Autoregressive Lag 1 
actor: Discount for non-differential
ccommodation
Delayed 
Current effect Lag 0 
V: Revenue from sophisticated
ifferentiated accommodation
Constant 
Autoregressive Lag 1 
actor: discount for sophisticated
ifferentiated accommodation
Order of integration 
Current effect Lag 0 
V: Revenue from environmental
riendly differentiated accommodation
Constant 
Order of integration 
actor: discount for environmentally
riendly differentiated accommodation
Delayed 
Current effect Lag 0 
ource: Prepared by the author of this article.
* p ≤ 0.01.
** p > 0.05.
able 4
ffects that types of seasonality have on revenue (total).
Variables Delay
V: Total
evenue Relative
Autoregressive Lag 1Lag 2
Moving average
Lag 2
Lag 3
Lag 4
Lag 7
eason Low season = 0; High season = 1 Lag 0
ays of the week Weekends = 0; Commercial working days = 1 Lag 0
ource: Prepared by the author of this article.
* p ≤ 0.01.
** p > 0.05.ração 51 (2016) 310–322 317
riendly differentials and those without differentials in relation
o other hotels, respectively. That is to say, discounts on services
ffering advanced differentials had a far greater impact than
hose given for other services. The effects of these discounts were
emporary – lasting only on the day they were implemented (very
hort-term temporal discriminationof). These did not, therefore
resent long term effects.
However, in the case of non-differential services and environ-
entally friendly differential services, the effects of a discount
ccur one day later (short latency purchase responsedem to gener-
te subsequent SDof). This is due to the fact that clients only settle
heir accounts when they check out of the hotel. Such delays are
ot observed in the case of differential sophisticated services,
ince payments are made before the client occupies the room.
Due to the non-stationary nature of the data for ARIMA mod-
ls for differential services, an integration order equivalent to
ne was allocated to this. As a result, the non-stationary effects
ere corrected. The adjusted residuals of the (Ljung–Box)
odels were higher than p  > 0.05, which shows there was no
ignificant autocorrelation between them. The data was better
djusted for services with sophisticated differentials (R2 sta-
ionary = 98.2%) and the data for the other relationships were
easonably well-adjusted. These can be more easily visualized
n Fig. 2, represented by Graphics A, B and C.
Estimate Standard error Ljung–Box R2 stationary
0.74* 0.09
28.6** 64%
0.55* 0.08
1
0.45* 0.15
−0.13* 0.05
19.7** 98.2%
0.30* 0.10
1
0.78* 0.15
−0.02 0.05
26.4** 53.8%
1
1
0.62* 0.29
 Estimate Error standard Ljung–Box R2 stationary
 1.24* 0.03
8.00** 78.7%
 −0.99* 0.03
 −0.26* 0.10
 −0.47* 0.10
 −0.70* 0.09
 −0.32* 0.10
 1.02* 0.12
 0.21* 0.08
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working days in the high season (HSWD) than at any otherhe sales revenue.
ource: Prepared by the author of this article.
Graph A shows the adjustments made for partial revenues for
on-differential services over time (during consecutive days),
ased on the predicted discounts. Graph B shows the adjustments
ade for partial revenues for sophisticated differential services,
hile Graph C shows the adjustments made for revenues for
nvironmentally friendly differential services.
he  effects  that  types  of  seasonality  exert  on  revenue
The non-stationarity corrected in the ARIMA model for the
ffects that discounts have on each type of services, show that
hese are due to the seasonality in the revenue data. Thus, all the
artial revenue data was aggregated into total revenue and exist-
ng seasonalities tested. Table 4 shows the effects of the intensity
p
t
pração 51 (2016) 310–322
f purchase responsedem over time on revenue (SDof) and the
ffects created by the greatest number of varied reinforcers avail-
ble to consumers (SRdem varied) over time on revenue (SDof).
With regards to the hotel researched, the low season (LS)
ccurs in the month of January and the high season (HS) during
he rest of the year. There were higher peaks in room occupancy
uring commercial working days (WD) rather than at weekends
WE). Thus, both the seasonality dimensions had a current effect
latency responsedem aggregated to generate subsequent SDof)
n revenue and, together with the lagged revenue, showed a
8.7% stationary explanatory variance. In addition, the seasonal
ffect (intensity of purchase responsedem aggregated over time)
s much stronger on revenue, almost five times greater, than
uring weekdays (period of greater number of varied reinforcers
SRdem varied) associated with purchase responsesdem).
he  effect  of  discounts  of  each  service  on  revenue  in
ifferent seasonal  demands
Fig. 3 shows the effects of reducing monetary punishments
ssociated with different degrees and types of reinforcers that
he offeror programs for the consumer, in a subsequent com-
ercial context by the offeror (revenue) in temporal context
ombinations of demand. Every reduction made of the pun-
shments programmed by the offeror for each service has a
ositive impact on revenue, bearing in mind the delay of
ne day for non-differential services and for environmentally
riendly services, as found in the first analysis. Combining
oth seasonal demands, we find the dimensions of service
emand responses (average occupancy rate LSWE = 20.3%,
SWD = 38.8%, HSWE = 41.1% and HSWD = 72.3%).
Implementing a price discount strategy for non-differential
ervices is similar during all the seasonal periods, being greater
n periods of high season and during commercial working days
HSWD). Thus, a discount of 10% in the cost of these services
enerates a total income of around 2.8 times the average revenue
f a company. While the same proportional increase in discounts
enerates 2.61 times the average revenue obtained at weekends
uring the high season (HSWE). This strategy does not signifi-
antly affect revenue in the low season and during commercial
orking days (LSWD).
A price discount strategy for sophisticated differential ser-
ices is implemented more often in the low season during
ommercial working days (LSWD) and, thereafter, during the
ow season at the weekends (LSWE). Thus, a discount of 10%
n the price of these services generates a total income of around
.31 times the average revenue of a company. Meanwhile, the
ame proportional increase in discounts generates 1.44 times the
verage revenue during commercial working days in the high
eason (HSWD). This strategy produces no significant impact
uring the high season and at weekends (HSWE).
The implementation of a price discount strategy for envi-
onmentally friendly differentials is greater during commercialeriod. Thus, a 10% price discount for these services generates
otal revenue of around 2.45 times the average income of a com-
any. Meanwhile, the same proportional increase in discounts
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ource: Prepared by the author of this article.
enerates 1.64 times a company’s average revenue during the
igh season at weekends (HSWE). This strategy shows no sig-
ificant effects in the low season during commercial working
ays (LSWD).
iscussion
These findings show that the effects that discounts have on
evenue depend on the service differentials involved, the policy
 company uses to charge its customers and the seasonality of
emand. The operant economic-behavioral theory explains these
ndings.
ow  the  commercial  cycle  is  explained  by  the  three-term
ilateral contingency
On the whole, these findings show how a commercial cycle
ccurs from an operant behavioral economy viewpoint (Foxall,
999; Vella & Foxall, 2013). This research shows how service
ifferentials (the offeror’s response when programming dif-
erent levels of reinforcers to consumers) generate different
mpacts in the subsequent revenue of a company (subsequent
ommercial context for an offeror derived from aggregated
urchase responses from consumers), depending on the price
iscounts allocated to these purchases (offerors response when
rogramming reduced monetary punishments to consumers). In
eneral terms, this creates a commercial cycle. Thus, the effort
nvolved in offering consumers different discriminative stimuli
hat release different levels of reinforcements and reduce mon-
tary punishments, generates a variety of customer purchase
harges that, if aggregated, generate new commercial discrim-
native stimuli for the offeror. This, in turn, creates favorable
ituations for the growth of the company itself and enables the
fferor to provide new customer responses.
Thus, the behavior of the offeror controls a good deal of the
ehavioral contexts of the company’s customers and the offeror
s effective when establishing monetary punishment associated
ith the magnitude of the reinforcers released through services,
hich, in turn, return to create new commercial contexts on
c
r
a
gn revenue (total) for seasonal demand. *p ≤ 0.01.
he part of the offeror. However, the consumers do not directly
ontrol the release of the offeror’s reinforcers (profit) or punish-
ents (losses). This release depends on the low financial cost
f the offeror’s own response with existing resources to perform
is role as the person who controls and regulates demand. If
he offerors themselves are effective, they can appropriate the
einforcers – profits (Vella & Foxall, 2011).
This supports the assumptions contained in the Service Dom-
nant Logic (Lusch & Vargo, 2014). The use by service managers
f specialized abilities and knowledge forms the basis of a fun-
amental unit of exchange, which provides consumers with a
ontext and projects reinforcers. The consumers reciprocate by
aying more money. So, this interaction between a consumer
nd the company is explained through a functional relationship
f dependence between one and the other, so that both parties
an obtain mutual benefits. The managers implement pricing
trategies and offer services in an attempt to encourage these
utual benefits.
he  effects  obtained  by  releasing  reinforcers  (services)  and
educing  punishments  (discounts)  for  the  consumer
Consumers did not generalize the offeror’s discriminative
timuli (Catania, 1998). That is to say, a company’s services had
ifferent purchasing rates (in this case, occupancy rates). Each
einforcer (types of service) programmed by the offeror gener-
tes distinct responses to demand. However, the effects obtained
y reducing monetary punishments (discounts) and the time it
akes to generate new commercial contexts for the offeror, are
uch the same (greater generalization).
Thus, sophisticated services are shown to be discriminative
timuli that indicate social reinforcers that represent sophistica-
ion (Liu, 2010), luxury (Yeoman & Mcmahon-Beattie, 2006),
nd exclusivity (Brun & Castelli, 2013; Veríssimo & Loureiro,
013), as well as more utilitarian reinforcers, providing greater
omfort and convenience (Foxall, 2010) for the consumer. This
epresents greater costs and efforts for the businessman or man-
ger but, if priced right, also greater profits, since this is a
eneralized utilitarian reinforcer (Vella & Foxall, 2011).
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This research shows that offering clients discounts on these
ervices is the best way to create a high impact on revenue. Dis-
ounts that reduce the size of the punishment consumers have
o pay (Oliveira-Castro, 2003; Porto & Silva, 2013; Rossiter &
oxall, 2008), make it easier to obtain reinforcers that are util-
tarian and socially mediated by other consumers. At the same
ime, these create a discriminative stimulus (revenue) that release
einforcers – profit (Talluri & Ryzin, 2005; Vella & Foxall,
011).
A similar explanation can be given for the other discounts
iven on other services. This is corroborated by the same posi-
ive effect obtained through discounts given on environmentally
riendly differential and basic services, which can be charac-
erized as a form of consumption that promotes a sense of
ell-being (Lima & Partidário, 2002), or hedonic in the first
ase and maintenance in the second case (Foxall, 2010). Ser-
ices that have sustainable features identify a company that
dopts environmental management (Felix & Santos, 2013) and
hich promotes positive feelings. Discounts make choices easier
or consumers who seek reinforcers related to their well-being,
n particular attracting those who could stay in non-differential
otel rooms, due to the similarity in prices.
Non-differential services, on the other hand, represent basic
onditions of hospitality (João, Merlo, & Morgado, 2010). In this
esearch study, these are priced lower in relation to sophisticated
ervices, thus, discounts related to these services have propor-
ionally less impact on revenue. However, discounts given on
his type of accommodation can create greater competitiveness
n relation to other hotels of the same size (Abrate et al., 2012)
nd therefore function to attract more consumers who seek basic
otel services.
Policies involved in how clients are requested to settle their
ccounts relates to response latency (Catania, 1973) from the
fferor himself, so as to create new commercial contexts for the
ompany (Vella & Foxall, 2011), indicating greater generalized
einforcers (Kanfer, 1960) – profit. This research study shows
hat this effect is delayed by one day for services that involve a
ower magnitude of revenue to the offeror and has an immediate
ffect in the case of those of larger magnitude.
In addition, the duration of the effect of a discount – the
ime it takes for an operant response (Catania, 1973) – on rev-
nue is short (lasting only on the day of the discount). Revenue
eturns to similar levels when the price goes back to normal,
hich is qualified as a business  as  usual  strategy (Hanssens &
ekimpe, 2012). This is because a temporary discount strategy
reates incremental and temporary revenue. The non-stationarity
ound in non-differential services, which would mean that rev-
nue did not return to the same level, is due to seasonality, which
s corrected in the ARIMA model by the method of difference
integration in the time series).
ow  seasonality  affects  revenueThe seasonality found is due to the demand for hotel accom-
odation services. Studies about the effects of seasonality have
ot had much of a theoretical basis (Koenig-Lewis & Bischoff,
005), but the findings of this study can help explain how
r
e
tração 51 (2016) 310–322
iscounts for each service (differential or otherwise) have a
ajor and positive impact on revenue depending on the seasona-
ity of demand. It was shown that creating revenue for a company
y means of a commercial cycle depends on an adjustment
eing made to aggregated consumer purchase responses, be this
ither to attract different segments (consumer heterogeneity),
r to attract more consumers from the same segment (num-
er/consumer intensity) (Evans, 2003; Smith, 1956).
These combinations of seasonal demands derive from the
eriodicity of aggregated purchases. These create contexts that
ither increase or decrease the effectiveness of the responses to
he programmed reinforcers and punishments that the offerors
ake available to consumers. Thus, during periods when there
s a low level of consumer purchases, discounts on sophisticated
ifferential services have more power to generate greater rev-
nue than during periods of high intensity of purchases and also
epresents the only discount strategy that has a significant effect
n the LSWD.
From a consumer’s point of view, since this type of service
nvolves greater punishments (higher prices) and high utilitarian
nd social reinforcers (Foxall, 2010), a price discount generates
n increase in revenue due to an increase in hotel occupancy
ates. This is what occurs, especially during periods when there
s a low volume of consumers (low season), a period that is more
eneficial to demand than to supply (Parker, 2013).
In the case of discounts for non-differential services, these are
enerated as the result of greater income being obtained when
here is a high intensity of consumers, but with slightly less
mpact than the discount capacity for sophisticated differentials
ue to the fact that there are a smaller number of consumers.
hese also have a reasonable impact on the LSWE. Again, from
 consumer’s point of view (Foxall, 2010), since these services
ffer basic hospitality reinforcers and are offered at low prices
low level of punishment), reducing these increases the aggre-
ated consumer purchase response, but not as much in relation
o services that offer greater reinforcers. Analogically speaking,
ut from the view of the offeror (Vella & Foxall, 2013), these
ervices are designed to generate greater revenues since they
ttract a higher intensity of consumer purchases while involving
ess punishments for the consumer. Reducing prices would not
ave such an effect in increasing revenue, because these already
epresent low levels of punishment. However, during the high
eason, these would attract proportionally a greater number of
onsumers, which would make this worthwhile to the offeror.
And finally, discounts for environmentally friendly services
reate less impact than the two services described above, but
reate a much greater positive impact as regards HSWD. These
ifferentials in services attract people who seek hedonistic rein-
orcers (Foxall, 2010) or those that promote a sense of well-being
Lima & Partidário, 2002). Reducing their prices does not make
s much difference as other services, probably because there
as still not a great demand for these at the time and place this
esearch was conducted, for consumers who are aware of these
einforcers (Peattie, 2010), leading to low room occupancy rates,
ven though these cost less.
This research study offers a counterpoint and specification to
he research conducted by Enz et al. (2009), who did not find
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trong macro-economic factors in the hospitality service com-
any revenues. It is possible that this was because they did not
nvestigate shorter seasonal periods or the interaction that exists
etween seasonality and pricing strategies for each service, for
hich the present study has obtained results.
onclusion
This research shows that (1) a commercial cycle for services
an be explained by behavioral economics, in particular by a
hree-term bilateral contingency; (2) price discounts have a pos-
tive and distinct impact with regards to the composition of a
ompany’s revenue; (3) the effects that discounts have on rev-
nue are very short-term – only lasting as long as the day on
hich they are implemented; (4) there is a delay of one day
efore it is possible to establish what effects discounts have had
n daily revenue from some of the services, due to check-out pro-
edures (payments are received only after the services have been
sed); (5) the effects that discount have on revenue are greater
or services that are more differential than for those that are
ess differential; (6) revenue data shows non-stationary effects,
hich requires their elimination from the ARIMA forecast; (7)
on-stationarity is due to seasonality, and this has two dimen-
ions related to demand – the number of purchases made and
he heterogeneity of the reinforcers of the buyers; (8) seasona-
ity that represents the period of purchasing intensity, exerts a
uch more positive effect on revenue than the season, which
epresents the period with the greatest or lesser heterogeneity of
einforcers of those who buy these services; (9) the effects that
iscounts have on revenue for non-differential services are simi-
ar during working days at the high season and during weekends
t the low season; (10) the effects of discounts on differential
nd sophisticated services are greater during the low season;
nd (11) the effects of discounts on environmentally friendly
nd differential services are greater during the high season and
n commercial working days.
Service managers, especially those involved in tourism, can
valuate and adjust their price discount policies by establishing
f there is a particular trend in their company’s revenue over time
nd, if so, to control these to ascertain the real effects of these
iscounts. These are price strategies that attract demand in the
hort-term and that need to be used continually in order to gener-
te ongoing effects on revenue. However, these have a different
ffect on a company’s revenue depending on the service differ-
ntials and the seasonal periods of demand. Discounts create
 greater impact on sophisticated differential services than on
hose with few differentials, so that a good strategy would be to
enerate the most revenue in periods when demand is low. In the
bsence of differentials (basic services), these discounts have lit-
le impact, but even so are still positive and similar to almost all
ther periods of the year, except for commercial working days
uring the low season.
The effectiveness of discounts can be ascertained in order
o establish better pricing strategies and to enhance the value
f the company by commercializing its products or services.
his research study can therefore help business, marketing
nd/or controller managers to better evaluate the right periods to
Hração 51 (2016) 310–322 321
mplement price discount policies. Using only the data related to
 service (hospitality) and only a small amount of data collected
uring the low season represent a limitation in the case of
his research. However, this study used up-to-date information
rovided by the company analyzed. In addition, the findings are
eneralized for situations when clients pay on the same day or
mmediately after using the services. In this way, the findings
ould be similar to other researches within these contexts.
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